TLS bootstrapping
In a Kubernetes cluster, the components on the worker nodes - kubelet and kube-proxy - need to communicate with Kubernetes master components, specifically kube-apiserver. In order to ensure that communication is kept private, not interfered with, and ensure that each component of the cluster is talking to another trusted component, we strongly recommend using client TLS certificates on nodes.
The normal process of bootstrapping these components, especially worker nodes that need certificates so they can communicate safely with kube-apiserver, can be a challenging process as it is often outside of the scope of Kubernetes and requires significant additional work. This in turn, can make it challenging to initialize or scale a cluster.
In order to simplify the process, beginning in version 1.4, Kubernetes introduced a certificate request and signing API to simplify the process. The proposal can be found here.
This document describes the process of node initialization, how to set up TLS client certificate bootstrapping for kubelets, and how it works.
Initialization Process
When a worker node starts up, the kubelet does the following:
- Look for its
kubeconfig
file - Retrieve the URL of the API server and credentials, normally a TLS key and signed certificate from the
kubeconfig
file - Attempt to communicate with the API server using the credentials.
Assuming that the kube-apiserver successfully validates the kubelet’s credentials, it will treat the kubelet as a valid node, and begin to assign pods to it.
Note that the above process depends upon:
- Existence of a key and certificate on the local host in the
kubeconfig
- The certificate having been signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) trusted by the kube-apiserver
All of the following are responsibilities of whoever sets up and manages the cluster:
- Creating the CA key and certificate
- Distributing the CA certificate to the master nodes, where kube-apiserver is running
- Creating a key and certificate for each kubelet; strongly recommended to have a unique one, with a unique CN, for each kubelet
- Signing the kubelet certificate using the CA key
- Distributing the kubelet key and signed certificate to the specific node on which the kubelet is running
The TLS Bootstrapping described in this document is intended to simplify, and partially or even completely automate, steps 3 onwards, as these are the most common when initializing or scaling a cluster.
Bootstrap Initialization
In the bootstrap initialization process, the following occurs:
- kubelet begins
- kubelet sees that it does not have a
kubeconfig
file - kubelet searches for and finds a
bootstrap-kubeconfig
file - kubelet reads its bootstrap file, retrieving the URL of the API server and a limited usage “token”
- kubelet connects to the API server, authenticates using the token
- kubelet now has limited credentials to create and retrieve a certificate signing request (CSR)
- kubelet creates a CSR for itself with the signerName set to
kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver-client-kubelet
- CSR is approved in one of two ways:
- If configured, kube-controller-manager automatically approves the CSR
- If configured, an outside process, possibly a person, approves the CSR using the Kubernetes API or via
kubectl
- Certificate is created for the kubelet
- Certificate is issued to the kubelet
- kubelet retrieves the certificate
- kubelet creates a proper
kubeconfig
with the key and signed certificate - kubelet begins normal operation
- Optional: if configured, kubelet automatically requests renewal of the certificate when it is close to expiry
- The renewed certificate is approved and issued, either automatically or manually, depending on configuration.
The rest of this document describes the necessary steps to configure TLS Bootstrapping, and its limitations.
Configuration
To configure for TLS bootstrapping and optional automatic approval, you must configure options on the following components:
- kube-apiserver
- kube-controller-manager
- kubelet
- in-cluster resources:
ClusterRoleBinding
and potentiallyClusterRole
In addition, you need your Kubernetes Certificate Authority (CA).
Certificate Authority
As without bootstrapping, you will need a Certificate Authority (CA) key and certificate. As without bootstrapping, these will be used to sign the kubelet certificate. As before, it is your responsibility to distribute them to master nodes.
For the purposes of this document, we will assume these have been distributed to master nodes at /var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem
(certificate) and /var/lib/kubernetes/ca-key.pem
(key). We will refer to these as “Kubernetes CA certificate and key”.
All Kubernetes components that use these certificates - kubelet, kube-apiserver, kube-controller-manager - assume the key and certificate to be PEM-encoded.
kube-apiserver configuration
The kube-apiserver has several requirements to enable TLS bootstrapping:
- Recognizing CA that signs the client certificate
- Authenticating the bootstrapping kubelet to the
system:bootstrappers
group - Authorize the bootstrapping kubelet to create a certificate signing request (CSR)
Recognizing client certificates
This is normal for all client certificate authentication. If not already set, add the --client-ca-file=FILENAME
flag to the kube-apiserver command to enable client certificate authentication, referencing a certificate authority bundle containing the signing certificate, for example --client-ca-file=/var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem
.
Initial bootstrap authentication
In order for the bootstrapping kubelet to connect to kube-apiserver and request a certificate, it must first authenticate to the server. You can use any authenticator that can authenticate the kubelet.
While any authentication strategy can be used for the kubelet’s initial bootstrap credentials, the following two authenticators are recommended for ease of provisioning.
Bootstrap tokens are a simpler and more easily managed method to authenticate kubelets, and do not require any additional flags when starting kube-apiserver. Using bootstrap tokens is currently beta as of Kubernetes version 1.12.
Whichever method you choose, the requirement is that the kubelet be able to authenticate as a user with the rights to:
- create and retrieve CSRs
- be automatically approved to request node client certificates, if automatic approval is enabled.
A kubelet authenticating using bootstrap tokens is authenticated as a user in the group system:bootstrappers
, which is the standard method to use.
As this feature matures, you should ensure tokens are bound to a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) policy which limits requests (using the bootstrap token) strictly to client requests related to certificate provisioning. With RBAC in place, scoping the tokens to a group allows for great flexibility. For example, you could disable a particular bootstrap group’s access when you are done provisioning the nodes.
Bootstrap tokens
Bootstrap tokens are described in detail here. These are tokens that are stored as secrets in the Kubernetes cluster, and then issued to the individual kubelet. You can use a single token for an entire cluster, or issue one per worker node.
The process is two-fold:
- Create a Kubernetes secret with the token ID, secret and scope(s).
- Issue the token to the kubelet
From the kubelet’s perspective, one token is like another and has no special meaning. From the kube-apiserver’s perspective, however, the bootstrap token is special. Due to its type
, namespace
and name
, kube-apiserver recognizes it as a special token, and grants anyone authenticating with that token special bootstrap rights, notably treating them as a member of the system:bootstrappers
group. This fulfills a basic requirement for TLS bootstrapping.
The details for creating the secret are available here.
If you want to use bootstrap tokens, you must enable it on kube-apiserver with the flag:
--enable-bootstrap-token-auth=true
Token authentication file
kube-apiserver has an ability to accept tokens as authentication. These tokens are arbitrary but should represent at least 128 bits of entropy derived from a secure random number generator (such as /dev/urandom
on most modern Linux systems). There are multiple ways you can generate a token. For example:
head -c 16 /dev/urandom | od -An -t x | tr -d ' '
will generate tokens that look like 02b50b05283e98dd0fd71db496ef01e8
.
The token file should look like the following example, where the first three values can be anything and the quoted group name should be as depicted:
02b50b05283e98dd0fd71db496ef01e8,kubelet-bootstrap,10001,"system:bootstrappers"
Add the --token-auth-file=FILENAME
flag to the kube-apiserver command (in your systemd unit file perhaps) to enable the token file. See docs here for further details.
Authorize kubelet to create CSR
Now that the bootstrapping node is authenticated as part of the system:bootstrappers
group, it needs to be authorized to create a certificate signing request (CSR) as well as retrieve it when done. Fortunately, Kubernetes ships with a ClusterRole
with precisely these (and only these) permissions, system:node-bootstrapper
.
To do this, you only need to create a ClusterRoleBinding
that binds the system:bootstrappers
group to the cluster role system:node-bootstrapper
.
# enable bootstrapping nodes to create CSR
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: create-csrs-for-bootstrapping
subjects:
- kind: Group
name: system:bootstrappers
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: system:node-bootstrapper
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kube-controller-manager configuration
While the apiserver receives the requests for certificates from the kubelet and authenticates those requests, the controller-manager is responsible for issuing actual signed certificates.
The controller-manager performs this function via a certificate-issuing control loop. This takes the form of a cfssl local signer using assets on disk. Currently, all certificates issued have one year validity and a default set of key usages.
In order for the controller-manager to sign certificates, it needs the following:
- access to the “Kubernetes CA key and certificate” that you created and distributed
- enabling CSR signing
Access to key and certificate
As described earlier, you need to create a Kubernetes CA key and certificate, and distribute it to the master nodes. These will be used by the controller-manager to sign the kubelet certificates.
Since these signed certificates will, in turn, be used by the kubelet to authenticate as a regular kubelet to kube-apiserver, it is important that the CA provided to the controller-manager at this stage also be trusted by kube-apiserver for authentication. This is provided to kube-apiserver with the flag --client-ca-file=FILENAME
(for example, --client-ca-file=/var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem
), as described in the kube-apiserver configuration section.
To provide the Kubernetes CA key and certificate to kube-controller-manager, use the following flags:
--cluster-signing-cert-file="/etc/path/to/kubernetes/ca/ca.crt" --cluster-signing-key-file="/etc/path/to/kubernetes/ca/ca.key"
for example:
--cluster-signing-cert-file="/var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem" --cluster-signing-key-file="/var/lib/kubernetes/ca-key.pem"
The validity duration of signed certificates can be configured with flag:
--cluster-signing-duration
Approval
In order to approve CSRs, you need to tell the controller-manager that it is acceptable to approve them. This is done by granting RBAC permissions to the correct group.
There are two distinct sets of permissions:
nodeclient
: If a node is creating a new certificate for a node, then it does not have a certificate yet. It is authenticating using one of the tokens listed above, and thus is part of the groupsystem:bootstrappers
.selfnodeclient
: If a node is renewing its certificate, then it already has a certificate (by definition), which it uses continuously to authenticate as part of the groupsystem:nodes
.
To enable the kubelet to request and receive a new certificate, create a ClusterRoleBinding
that binds the group in which the bootstrapping node is a member system:bootstrappers
to the ClusterRole
that grants it permission, system:certificates.k8s.io:certificatesigningrequests:nodeclient
:
# Approve all CSRs for the group "system:bootstrappers"
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: auto-approve-csrs-for-group
subjects:
- kind: Group
name: system:bootstrappers
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: system:certificates.k8s.io:certificatesigningrequests:nodeclient
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
To enable the kubelet to renew its own client certificate, create a ClusterRoleBinding
that binds the group in which the fully functioning node is a member system:nodes
to the ClusterRole
that grants it permission, system:certificates.k8s.io:certificatesigningrequests:selfnodeclient
:
# Approve renewal CSRs for the group "system:nodes"
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: auto-approve-renewals-for-nodes
subjects:
- kind: Group
name: system:nodes
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: system:certificates.k8s.io:certificatesigningrequests:selfnodeclient
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
The csrapproving
controller that ships as part of kube-controller-manager and is enabled by default. The controller uses the SubjectAccessReview
API to determine if a given user is authorized to request a CSR, then approves based on the authorization outcome. To prevent conflicts with other approvers, the builtin approver doesn’t explicitly deny CSRs. It only ignores unauthorized requests. The controller also prunes expired certificates as part of garbage collection.
kubelet configuration
Finally, with the master nodes properly set up and all of the necessary authentication and authorization in place, we can configure the kubelet.
The kubelet requires the following configuration to bootstrap:
- A path to store the key and certificate it generates (optional, can use default)
- A path to a
kubeconfig
file that does not yet exist; it will place the bootstrapped config file here - A path to a bootstrap
kubeconfig
file to provide the URL for the server and bootstrap credentials, e.g. a bootstrap token - Optional: instructions to rotate certificates
The bootstrap kubeconfig
should be in a path available to the kubelet, for example /var/lib/kubelet/bootstrap-kubeconfig
.
Its format is identical to a normal kubeconfig
file. A sample file might look as follows:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Config
clusters:
- cluster:
certificate-authority: /var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem
server: https://my.server.example.com:6443
name: bootstrap
contexts:
- context:
cluster: bootstrap
user: kubelet-bootstrap
name: bootstrap
current-context: bootstrap
preferences: {}
users:
- name: kubelet-bootstrap
user:
token: 07401b.f395accd246ae52d
The important elements to note are:
certificate-authority
: path to a CA file, used to validate the server certificate presented by kube-apiserverserver
: URL to kube-apiservertoken
: the token to use
The format of the token does not matter, as long as it matches what kube-apiserver expects. In the above example, we used a bootstrap token. As stated earlier, any valid authentication method can be used, not only tokens.
Because the bootstrap kubeconfig
is a standard kubeconfig
, you can use kubectl
to generate it. To create the above example file:
kubectl config --kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/bootstrap-kubeconfig set-cluster bootstrap --server='https://my.server.example.com:6443' --certificate-authority=/var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem
kubectl config --kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/bootstrap-kubeconfig set-credentials kubelet-bootstrap --token=07401b.f395accd246ae52d
kubectl config --kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/bootstrap-kubeconfig set-context bootstrap --user=kubelet-bootstrap --cluster=bootstrap
kubectl config --kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/bootstrap-kubeconfig use-context bootstrap
To indicate to the kubelet to use the bootstrap kubeconfig
, use the following kubelet flag:
--bootstrap-kubeconfig="/var/lib/kubelet/bootstrap-kubeconfig" --kubeconfig="/var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig"
When starting the kubelet, if the file specified via --kubeconfig
does not exist, the bootstrap kubeconfig specified via --bootstrap-kubeconfig
is used to request a client certificate from the API server. On approval of the certificate request and receipt back by the kubelet, a kubeconfig file referencing the generated key and obtained certificate is written to the path specified by --kubeconfig
. The certificate and key file will be placed in the directory specified by --cert-dir
.
Client and Serving Certificates
All of the above relate to kubelet client certificates, specifically, the certificates a kubelet uses to authenticate to kube-apiserver.
A kubelet also can use serving certificates. The kubelet itself exposes an https endpoint for certain features. To secure these, the kubelet can do one of:
- use provided key and certificate, via the
--tls-private-key-file
and--tls-cert-file
flags - create self-signed key and certificate, if a key and certificate are not provided
- request serving certificates from the cluster server, via the CSR API
The client certificate provided by TLS bootstrapping is signed, by default, for client auth
only, and thus cannot be used as serving certificates, or server auth
.
However, you can enable its server certificate, at least partially, via certificate rotation.
Certificate Rotation
Kubernetes v1.8 and higher kubelet implements beta features for enabling rotation of its client and/or serving certificates. These can be enabled through the respective RotateKubeletClientCertificate
and RotateKubeletServerCertificate
feature flags on the kubelet and are enabled by default.
RotateKubeletClientCertificate
causes the kubelet to rotate its client certificates by creating new CSRs as its existing credentials expire. To enable this feature pass the following flag to the kubelet:
--rotate-certificates
RotateKubeletServerCertificate
causes the kubelet both to request a serving certificate after bootstrapping its client credentials and to rotate that certificate. To enable this feature pass the following flag to the kubelet:
--rotate-server-certificates
Note:
The CSR approving controllers implemented in core Kubernetes do not approve node serving certificates for security reasons. To use
RotateKubeletServerCertificate
operators need to run a custom approving controller, or manually approve the serving certificate requests.A deployment-specific approval process for kubelet serving certificates should typically only approve CSRs which:
- are requested by nodes (ensure the
spec.username
field is of the formsystem:node:<nodeName>
andspec.groups
containssystem:nodes
)- request usages for a serving certificate (ensure
spec.usages
containsserver auth
, optionally containsdigital signature
andkey encipherment
, and contains no other usages)- only have IP and DNS subjectAltNames that belong to the requesting node, and have no URI and Email subjectAltNames (parse the x509 Certificate Signing Request in
spec.request
to verifysubjectAltNames
)
Other authenticating components
All of TLS bootstrapping described in this document relates to the kubelet. However, other components may need to communicate directly with kube-apiserver. Notable is kube-proxy, which is part of the Kubernetes control plane and runs on every node, but may also include other components such as monitoring or networking.
Like the kubelet, these other components also require a method of authenticating to kube-apiserver. You have several options for generating these credentials:
- The old way: Create and distribute certificates the same way you did for kubelet before TLS bootstrapping
- DaemonSet: Since the kubelet itself is loaded on each node, and is sufficient to start base services, you can run kube-proxy and other node-specific services not as a standalone process, but rather as a daemonset in the
kube-system
namespace. Since it will be in-cluster, you can give it a proper service account with appropriate permissions to perform its activities. This may be the simplest way to configure such services.
kubectl approval
CSRs can be approved outside of the approval flows builtin to the controller manager.
The signing controller does not immediately sign all certificate requests. Instead, it waits until they have been flagged with an “Approved” status by an appropriately-privileged user. This flow is intended to allow for automated approval handled by an external approval controller or the approval controller implemented in the core controller-manager. However cluster administrators can also manually approve certificate requests using kubectl. An administrator can list CSRs with kubectl get csr
and describe one in detail with kubectl describe csr <name>
. An administrator can approve or deny a CSR with kubectl certificate approve <name>
and kubectl certificate deny <name>
.